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RECENT DECISIONS
PAROLE-

DuE PROCESS

-

Ti=

SERVED ON PAROLE NOT DEDUCTED FROM

Plaintiff had been sentenced to a term of two to six years for assault
with a deadly weapon. After two years in prison, he was paroled and remained
on parole for almost twenty months. Plaintiff's parole was revoked when he was
jailed for intoxication, and subsequently he was returned to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his original sentence without credit for his time on parole.
The district court dismissed plaintiff's motion for a declaratory judgment in which
he claimed credit against his sentence for the twenty months he served on parole.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held: affirmed.
The court gave effect to the clear language of the statute: "the time a prisoner
was on parole shall not be taken into account to diminish the time for which he
was sentenced." Bates v. Rivers, 323 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
The District of Columbia statute applied here does indeed seem to be clear
and unequivocal. 1 Nonetheless, Judge J. Skelly Wright dissented, arguing that
parole is imprisonment in legal effect, and consequently a statute authorizing
imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence imposed on a criminal, would
raise constitutional doubts. Therefore, if the statute is susceptible to another interpretation, the statute should be construed to avoid the constitutional question.
In the dissenter's view, the alternate construction of the statute is that "a sentence
may not be diminished for good conduct while on parole. ' 2 While this alternate
construction does violence to the plain words of the statute, it quite effectively
removes the stinger without the necessity of declaring the statute unconstitutional.
The law on the question of whether or not time spent on parole should be
deducted from the original sentence when a parolee is returned to prison is primarily statutory.3 Roughly twenty-three states provide that the time spent on
parole shall be counted as time on the original sentence, 4 while another
eight statess and the federal statute6 provide that the time may be credited at the
discretion of the parole board. The remaining states 7 and the District of Columbia
explicitly forbid giving credit for the time spent on parole. The Supreme Court
has apparently never expressly decided the constitutionality of these statutes. In
Anderson v. Corall,8 the petitioner violated his parole shortly after his release from
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D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-206 (1961) provides, in part:
If the order of parole shall be revoked, the prisoner, unless subsequently
reparoled, shall serve the remainder of the sentence originally imposed less
any commutation for good conduct which may be earned by him after his
return to custody. For the purpose of computing commutation for good conduct, the remainder of the sentence originally imposed shall be considered as
a new sentence. The time a prisoner was on parole shall not be taken into
account to diminish the time for which he was sentenced.
Bates v. Rivers, 323 F.2d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.22, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
E.g., ALA. CODE fit. 42, § 12 (1940):
The board . . . may, if it sees fit, require such prisoner to serve out in
prison the balance of the term for which he was originally sentenced calculated from the date of delinquency or, such part thereof as it may determine.

supra note 3.
18 U.S.C. § 4205 provides, in part:
The unexpired term of imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to

MODEL PENAL CODE,

run from the date he is returned to the custody of the Attorney General
under said warrant, and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not
diminish the time he was sentenced to serve. (Emphasis added.)
18 U.S.C. § 4207 further provides:
If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so terminated,
the said prisoner may be required to serve all or any part of the remainder

7
8

of the term for which he was sentenced. (Emphasis added.)
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 3.

263 U.S. 193 (1923).
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a federal prison. Before he could be retaken, he was convicted of another crime
by a state court and subsequently confined. Upon his release from the state prison,
the federal parole board ordered him retaken and returned to serve the remainder
of his first sentence, remaining time to be computed as that due on the date of
his parole. The Supreme Court upheld the action of the parole board. However,
the thrust of the Court's opinion was directed at the board's refusal to credit the
time served in the state prison and not the four months on parole before the

violation: "his status and rights were analogous to those of an escaped convict." 9
In fact, some of the language in the opinion has formed the nucleus of later attacks
on the constitutionality of these statutes.
Mere lapse of time without imprisonment or other restraint contemplated by the law does not constitute service of sentence. . . . While on
parole the convict is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the
control of the warden until the expiration of the term ....
While this is an
amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment.10
Though numerous attacks have been made on the federal statute and similar state
statutes, often citing this very language from Anderson v. Corall, the lower federal
courts" x and the state courts' 2 have consistently held the statutes constitutional and
the Supreme Court has several times denied certiorari.' 3
Under our political system the legislature has the power to determine what
conduct will be considered criminal and to provide the punishment for such conduct. This legislative authority is restricted only by Constitutional limitations and
prohibitions. The attacks on the parole statutes which deny credit for time on
parole have been based on claims such as cruel and unusual 7 punishment, 4 double
jeopardy,' 5 equal protection,' and most often, due process.1
Even though the decisions have been to the contrary, petitioners' hopes are
never completely extinguished because of frequent dicta characterizing the legal
effect of parole such as that in Anderson v. Corall. In McCoy v. Harris,,
where the parolee's right to a hearing before revocation of his parole was at stake,
the court said:
Granting of a parole does not change the status of a prisoner; it merely
"pushes back the prison walls" and allows him the wider freedom of movement while serving his sentence. The paroled prisoner is legally in custody
the same as the prisoner
allowed the liberty of the prison yard, or of working
9
on the prison farm.'
In a recent case, the Supreme Court pointed out that the custody and control
of a parolee both in theory and in fact "involve significant restraints on petitioner's
liberty." 20 The Court pointed out that the parolee is subject to restrictions above
and beyond those imposed on the ordinary citizen; the parolee is limited in his
choice of a community, choice of a job, and choice of friends. In addition he must
report periodically to his parole officer and follow the officer's advice.
However, in most of the cases dealing with the subject, the precise legal effect
of parole and the restrictions it imposes are not thoroughly explored and often
9 Anderson v. Corall, supra note 8, at 196.
10 Id. at 196. (Emphasis added.)
11 E.g., Dolan v. Swope, 138 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1943); U.S. v. Rundle, 218 F. Supp. 567
(E.D. Pa. 1963); Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1962).
12 E.g., Mayo v. Warden of the Md. Penitentiary, 231 Md. 635, 190 A.2d 810 (1963);
Greenwood v. Gladden, 231 Ore. 396, 373 P.2d 417 (1962).
13 E.g., Howard v. U.S. 274 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 832 (1960);
Dalton v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 216 F. Supp. 600 (D. Md. 1963), cert. to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied 373 U.S. 942 (1963).
14 E.g., Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1962).
15 E.g., Dolan v. Swope, 138 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1943).
16 E.g., Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1962).
17 E.g., Dalton v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 216 F. Supp. 600 (D. Md. 1963), cert. to
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied 373 U.S. 942 (1943).
18 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945).
19 Id. at 722.
20 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963).
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simply ignored. 21 The courts seem to be satisfied merely with a statement that there
is a difference between parole and actual imprisonment. Thus, a state supreme
court has suggested that for certain purposes a person on parole continues to be
under the custody of the warden, but that this does not mean that custody during
parole is in all respects tantamount to incarceration.2 2 A federal court admitted
that under the federal statute a prisoner might remain in the custody of state
authorities for a period in excess of the term of his sentence originally imposed,
but it pointed out that he could not be incarcerated for a period in excess of
that term. 23 The court further said that while parole may sometimes constitute
imprisonment in
legal effect, "it clearly is not the equivalent of legal imprisonment
24
in every case."
In conjunction with their contentions that parole is a legal equivalent of
incarceration, petitioners claim that the failure to deduct time spent on parole
from the remaining sentence is "inherently unfair" 25 and may amount to, what
one counsel termed, "the yo-yo theory of prisoner rehabilitation." 26 This argument
is simply that under these statutes the state's "custody" or "control" of an individual can be extended by successive paroles and revocations far beyond the maximum sentence imposed by the judge. In meeting this line of attack, the courts
frequently seem to be preconditioned by traditional theories about parole; that
parole is merely an act of grace subject to whatever terms the legislature may
impose, or that it is a contract between the parolee and the state which includes
certain terms.2 7 It is obvious that once the consideration of the problem is so
structured, the prisoner is almost precluded from complaining that the term of
his sentence has been extended beyond the date when it originally would have
expired, since it logically follows that the extension results from his conditional
release which he voluntarily accepted.
Another reply to the charge that the parolee's sentence is being extended is
that the provisions governing the granting and revocation of parole are established
by the legislature and consequently are "potentially a part of the original sentence." 28 Thus it has been said that the judges are aware of the possibility in
sentencing. 29 The emphasis here is not on whether parole is a legal equivalent of
imprisonment, but on the fact that the parole is a legitimate part of the sentence
and not an addition to the sentence.
It is generally felt that the purpose of parole is to aid in the reformation
and rehabilitation of the offender by permitting him to live in the community
much like an average citizen except that the parolee remains under the supervision
of the authorities.2 0 In view of this function of parole, it would seem that in coming to grips with the problems which arise in this area, parole should be considered
as an integral part of the penal system and not characterized as "mere grace" or
as a "contract!'; nor is it realistic to say that by accepting parole, the prisoner
consents to whatever conditions may be attached.
Many of the difficult questions concerning parole arise because parole is not
easily characterized. It is obvious that in many respects parole is quite different
from actual imprisonment; however, it is also clear that the imposition and
21 E.g., Howard v. U.S., 274 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1960).
22 Greenwood v. Gladden, 231 Ore. 396, 373 P.2d 417 (1962).
23 Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D. Md. 1962).24 Id. at 950.
25 Brief for Appellant p. 9 , Bates v. Rivers, 323 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
26 Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 952 (D. Md. 1962).
27 See Burns v. U.S., 287 U.S. 216 (1932) cited in Dolan v. Swope, 138 F.2d 301 (7th
Cir. 1943); Woods v. Steiner, supra note 26. See generally 65 -ARv. L. Rv. 309 (1951);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.21, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
28 Dolan v. Swope, supra note 27, at 304.
29 Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1962).
30 See 5 WAYNE L. Rav. 237 (1959); Street, Parole - Policy and Procedure, 4 CRiM.
L. Q. 432 (1962).
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restrictions of parole are considerably greater than those upon the ordinary citizen.
The determination of the legal effect of parole as diminishing or extending a
sentence should be made with this ambiguous nature of parole kept in mind and
in light of two general, but conflicting considerations. The first is based on one
of the primary purposes of modem penology- the restoration of the criminal
to a normal law-abiding citizen, while at the same time affording maximum
protection to society. It is, however, nearly impossible to predict the exact length
of imprisonment and supervision which will most effectively assist in reaching this
goal. 3 On the other hand, the universal sentencing procedure of either a fixed
sentence or a minimum and maximum sentence reflects the underlying feeling
that there should be some set limit to the length of time one may be imprisoned
or kept in custody 3 2 The statutes which deny credit for time served on parole may
indeed extend the duration of control beyond the prisoner's maximum sentence,
yet the total period of control, though not expressly stated, is limited in theory and
even more so in practical operation. The parole-revocation-imprisonmentreparole cycle can only last until either the offender serves his maximum sentence
in prison or his sentence expires while he is on parole. Thus, the system of not
granting credit for time served on parole falls between an express and definite
maximum period of custody and a wholly indeterminate sentence in this respect.
The constitutional attack upon these statutes must mean either that the
legislature does not have the power to establish this type of system or that the
means of accomplishing it are improper. It seems clear that the legislature could
achieve the similar result merely by providing that all maximum sentences will
also include a parole period of equal length. Hence, a five year sentence would
also include a five year parole period which in effect would amount to a ten year
period of permissive custody. Nevertheless, the present method utilized by the
legislature, the nondeduction of time on parole, leaves a faint but lingering odor
of unfairness even though it may be "potentially part of the original sentence."
The drafters of the Model Penal Code felt that "it is a demoralizing experience
to the parolee who has conformed to the rules over an extended period then to
be required to 'back up' such time and serve it over in prison." 33 The Model Penal
Code provides:
A parolee whose parole is revoked for violation of the conditions of
parole should be recommitted for the remainder of his maximum parole
term, after credit thereon for the period served on parole prior to the violation and for reductions for good behavior earned while on parole.34

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the parole board's aim is not to "demoralize"
parolees, but just the opposite, to assist them to conform to the necessary rules of
society. Thus, even where the decision of whether or not to credit the time spent
on parole is not left to the discretion of the parole board, the parolee usually will
be again encouraged to reform and accelerate his release by the availability of good
conduct time and the opportunity for reparole.3 5
It is submitted that while the relative merits of granting or forbidding credit
for time served on parole are debatable, the statutes forbidding credit do not so
drastically shift the balance between social needs and individual liberty that they
fall below the Constitutional minimum.
William A. Bish

31

THE COMMITTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

(1942).
32 Ibid.
33 MODEL PENAL CODR § 305.22, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
34 MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.17 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). (Emphasis added.)
35 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. supra note 1.
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ANTITRUST SECTION I, SHERMAN ACT TYING ARRANGEMENTS NETwoRx AGREEMENT CONDITIONING SALE OF DESIRED STATIONS TO THE PURCHASE
oF OTHER STATIONS CONSTITUTES PER SE VIOLATION. - Kemper Insurance Com-

panies' brought an action in the United States District Court for damages and
injunctive relief alleging its agreement with American Broadcasting Company
(hereinafter ABC) to sponsor the news program "Evening Report" on the thirtyfive unwanted stations in addition to the ninety-five2 desired stations to be a tying
agreement, a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 Upon a motion by
defendant ABC to dismiss or strike certain paragraphs of Kemper's complaint
under Federal Rule 12(b) (6), the District Court, citing Moore, Federal Practice,
that
...
a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears
to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim.4

held: motion denied. The complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
This case represents the first attempt to apply the tying agreement violation
to network-sponsor agreements, and its importance lies in the ultimate decision
on this question. As the practice is not limited to ABC (National Broadcasting
System and Columbia Broadcasting System (hereinafter NBC and CBS) engage
in similar practices), a holding that these practices constitute a tying agreement
in violation of the Sherman Act will have a profound effect on the television and
advertising industries.5
Viewing this case in a historical framework, a holding that these arrangements constitute per se violations would be the furthest extension of an everexpanding concept of tying agreements. Since it does not seem that the question
is strictly controlled by existing precedents, policy considerations will undoubtedly
weigh heavily in determining the merits of extending section 1 of the Sherman
Act to these arrangements.
The arrangement complained of is a hybrid of "must buy," a refusal by the
networks to sell less than a basic unit of stations," and the "minimum buy," a
refusal by networks to sell less than a minimum dollar value of advertising.'
Although it was not alleged in Kemper's complaint that any of the one hundred
and thirty television stations had been designated "basic required" stations,8 and
counsel for ABC have urged that ABC does not engage in the "must buy" practice,
the "dominant gene" appears to be "must buy," and in discussing the merits of
these arrangements it is more accurate and helpful to consider this a type of "must
buy" practice.
1 Plaintiffs: American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., American Motorists Ins. Co., Federal Mut. Ins.
Co., and Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. are commonly called and hereinafter referred to as the
Kemper Insurance Companies, or Kemper.
2 Complaint of Plaintiff, p. 3, states: the geographical pattern of Kemper's sales of
insurance is such that it is desirable to advertise by television in these 95 market areas; Kemper
does not make extensive sales and did not wish to advertise in the other thirty-five.
3 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal......
4 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 12.08, at 2245 2d ed. (1962). (Emphasis omitted.)
5 At the present time these network practices are neither sanctioned nor prohibited by the
Federal Communications Commission rules.
6 At the time of this survey, Comm. on Interstate and -Foreign Commerce, Network
Broadcasting,H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 480-81 (1958), (hereinafter Network
Broadcasting), NBC had a basic list of 58 stations while CBS had a basic list of 56. The list
has undoubtedly grown.
7 ABC used the minimum dollar requirement of $60,000 per Class A hour. On the average, an ABC advertiser would have to order 85 to 90 of the 220 ABC affiliates in order to meet
the minimum dollar requirement. Network Broadcasting,496, 477.
8 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 23.
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While standing to maintain this suit only requires a direct injury to Kemper,9
the courts will undoubtedly look to the various policy considerations involved in
making a determination on the per se violation question. Counterbalancing the
repercussions of such arrangements on advertisers, independent stations and affiliates, are the practical needs of a network in successfully maintaining its national character.
It is unlikely that the "must buy" policy has any significant effect on the
accessibility of network television to smaller advertisers, and therefore in actuality
gives no competitive advantage to large advertisers. Even without "must" or "minimum buy" requirements the cost of network time and programs would be prohibitive for small advertisers, and so long as there are national advertisers anxious
to purchase most of the network's lineup of stations on a wholesale basis the networks are not likely to accept a substantial loss of revenue by selling piecemeal
merely to accommodate smaller advertisers. While the effect of forcing advertisers
to purchase larger station groupings is minimized by Network Broadcasting,'0 a
comprehensive congressional study, the instant case illustrates that this effect may
be a problem in at least some instances.
It has been reported that "must buy" puts the independent station at a competitive disadvantage vis-ii-vis the network affiliate operating in the same market."One of the few reported complaints was registered by KTTV (Los Angeles)
against CBS:
[W]e are told by the advertiser or his agency that despite the fact that
the KTTV proposal is more attractive, the advertiser must place the program on the network station in Los Angeles or he will be deprived of the
opportunity of 2placing the program on stations affiliated with that network
in other cities.'

CBS replied that KTTV's complaint is not grounded on the must buy arrangement but rather on the right to first call and territorial exclusivity conferred on
network affiliates by their contracts (an unaffiliated station can only gain access
to a program after the primary affiliate has turned it down). Still if the network
can name the affiliates the sponsor must purchase, the network will have a strong
weapon for driving out competition. There is little evidence, however, to refute
the Network Study Staff's conclusion that "the 'must buy' policy, as such, is not
a significant restraint on the independent station."' 1
Affiliates are generally delighted if included in the basic unit. There is an
economic benefit in the procurement by the networks of sponsors, and the affiliates

are anxious to be granted access to a larger share of network programming. While
it has been contended that even optional or supplementary stations benefit because
once the advertiser has made the larger investment he is more disposed to add
other stations to his lineup, this claim is debatable,' 4 perhaps fictive.

The augmentation of network bargaining leverage through selection of stations
presents a problem. A network certainly can and will "remind" an affiliate of its
favored position when seeking clearance for network commercial programs. Such
extension of economic pressure represents a serious issue of public interest. The
Federal Communications Commission policy has always been that the "station

licensee must be free to exercise his best judgment with respect to the programs
broadcast over his facilities."' 5 Because of its ability to select stations to be sold
to its national advertisers, a network may persuade affiliates to accept other network
9

See: Osborn v. Sinclair Refining, 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960). It was held that the

buyer could recover for harm suffered as a result of a tie-in imposed directly on him.

10 Network Broadcasting,484.
11 Antitrust Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, The Teleision Broadcasting Indus y, H.R. REP. No. 607, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., 86 (1957).
12 Network Broadcasting,492.
13 Id. at 494.
14 Id. at 489-90.
15 Id. at 491.
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programs it would 'not otherwise be disposed to carry. This practice itself would
be a type of tying agreement.
Is the "must or minimum buy" requisite for the running of a network? Yes,
is the unanimous reply of network managing executives. ABC President Robert
Kinter asserted "It is axiomatic that a minimum economic base must be maintained
if the operation of a network is to be supported."' Robert Sarnoff of NBC put
it in these words:
The must buy policy provides for use of a national network on a
national basis. It is essential to networking, and each network has worked
out its own formula on the matter.... The must buy stations . .. provide

and logical minimumbasic national circulation. They form a reasonable
7
purchase unit for national-marketing purposes.'
These needs are not imaginary. It is apparent that the national television
network as presently constituted could not continue to exist if it were unable to
sell the time of more than a small proportion of its affiliated stations to any advertiser. 18 Without a minimum group, fragmentation would result; the networks
would be unable to meet staggering interconnection costs and national programming would be impossible.
The concept of tying arrangement was introduced as early as 1910 in Standard
Oil v. United States.'9 In that case "the rule of reason" was the criterion. This
rule has been supplemented during the last seventeen years by Supreme Court
decisions, from InternationalSalt Co. v. United States2 ° to United States v. Loew's
Inc.,21 which cases provide an excellent context in which to evaluate the per se violation issue in question. Upon analysis, at least two doctrinal variations of a per se
violation of section 1 appear applicable, casting serious doubt on the legality of the
ABC-Kemper arrangement.
Professor Bernard Schwartz concludes that "the 'must buy' practice . . .
seems to fit squarely within the Northern Pacific2 2 definition of a tying arrangement." 23 In that case the Supreme Court held that preferential routing clauses
(in contracts for the sale of railroad land) which compelled the grantee or lessee
to ship over railroad lines all commodities produced or manufactured on these
lands (provided the rates were equal to those of competing carriers) were tying
arrangements and per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court
defines tying arrangement as
[A]n agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product.....4
The ABC-Kemper agreement certainly seems to fit this formula. ABC agrees to
sell one product (time on ninety-five affiliated stations desired by Kemper) only
on the condition that the buyer (Kemper) purchase a different product (time
on the thirty-five undesired stations).
The recent case of United States v. Loew's Inc. 25 is even more directly on
point. The Supreme Court enjoined Loew's from conditioning, or tying the-sale
or license of the right to exhibit any film over any television station to the purchase
16 Statement of Robert Kintner before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-

merce, U.S. Senate (1956), pp. 2500-01, quoted in Network Broadcasting,496.
17 Testimony of President Robert Sarnoff, NBC, Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (1956), p. 6020, quoted in Network Broad-

casting, 495.
18 Network Broadcasting, 497.
19

221 U.S. 1 (1910).

20 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
21 371 U.S. 38 (1962). The unanimous Court held: the block-booking rationale of United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), applies with equal force to the television industry.
22 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
23 Bernard Schwartz, Antitrust and the FCC: The Problem of Network Dominance, 107
U.PA. L. Rav. 753, 780 (1959).
24 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, supra note 22, at 5.

25 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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or sale of other films. This practice called "block booking" was held to be a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. The conditioning of the sale of "Treasure of Sierra
Madre,.... Casablanca," "Johnny Belinda" and other desired films upon the acceptance of 'Tugboat Annie Sails Again," "Nancy Drew Troubleshooter," and
"Gorilla Man" is undeniably analogous to the ABC-Kemper arrangement of conditioning the sale of the affiliates in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Dallas to those of
Pembina, Monahans, and Klamath Falls.
The Loew's case also seems to destroy the network argument that tying arrangements involve the tying of different products whereas this arrangement deals only
with quantity rather than different products. Unless the court is willing to distinguish "Tugboat Annie" from Pembina, there is no escaping the Loew's rationale.
The District Court is justified in rejecting the ABC contention based on TimesPicayune26 that there is only one product involved. 27 Affiliates seem to be sufficiently dissimilar to be classified as "different" products.
The Times-Picayune requirement of dominance or monopoly power over the
tying product as a prerequisite to the application of the "per se rule" has also
been vitiated by the Northern Pacific and Loew's decision.
While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion which
speaks of "monopoly power" or "dominance" over the tying product as a

necessary precondition for application of the rule of per se unreasonableness

to tying arrangements, we do not construe this general language as requiring
anything more than sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable
restraint on free competition in the tied product ... 2

Loew's buttresses Northern Pacific, holding:
Market dominance - some power to control price and to exclude competition - is by no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite
economic power. Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial
economic power may be inferred from the tying
product's desirability to con29
sumers or from uniqueness of its attributes.

It is submitted that a consideration of the ABC-Kemper arrangement in view
of Loew's and Northern Pacific leads to the inescapable conclusion that it is a tying
agreement and a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The only reason
for distinguishing the instant case would be strong policy considerations necessitating the continuance of the "must buy" practice. Such weighty considerations
are not manifest.
While a minimal network requirement seems reasonable as an incident to the
national advertising and programming services provided by the networks, no
cogent argument that the "minimum buy" will not satisfy the network's needs is
apparent. The real objections to the must buy practice, (1) the forcing of advertisers to order particular stations against their wishes (Kemper's complaint) and
(2) the use of the increased economic leverage given the network permitting it
to obtain clearances that might not otherwise be forthcoming, are not inherent in
minimum buy. No need is shown for the specification of stations by the networks.
The advertiser is certainly in a better position to determine the importance of
different stations in his national advertising scheme.
Minimum buy can also be legally distinguished and justified. It is submitted
that the legal objections to tying arrangements vaporize when the advertiser is
free to choose his own stations at a specified aggregate minimum price. This is
more approximative of a limitation on quantity. A purchaser can't buy one cigarette or one stuffed olive; he has to buy a pack or a jar. They are marketed this
way because it is the most financially sound way to sell them. For the same reason,
minimum buy is a valid marketing device. The stock tests for "same" or "different
26 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
27 American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221
F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S., at 11.
29 371 U.S. at 45.
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products" 30 are not helpful "out of context." The affiliate station is certainly
different enough to be a tied product and consequently serve monopolistic ends
when the network has control over its saleability to national advertisers. Conversely, stations are sufficiently similar that when the advertiser, limited only by
a minimum purchase requirement, is choosing they look to be quantities of the
same product.
While a judicial decision grounded on such a protean classification would be
tenuous, it might well facilitate the charting of the judicial course between the
Scylla of network monopolistic greed and the Charybdis of network extinction.
Richard D. Catenacci

DOMESTIC RELATIONS -

SUPPORT OF INSANE PERSONs -

STATUTE IMPOSING

LIAzrLrry ON RELATIVES FOR SUPPORT OF THE INSANE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-In January, 1953, Mrs. Auguste Schaeche, a California resident, was adjudged
mentally ill and was committed to Agnews State Hospital, California.

In August, 1960, Ellinor Vance, Mrs. Schaeche's adult daughter, died, and in
November of that year the Director of Mental Hygiene acting under the laws of
the state filed a claim against Ellinor's estate for $7,554.22, the reasonable cost
for maintenance and care of Mrs. Schaeche from 1956 to 1960. The administratrix
of the daughter's estate defended on the ground that the state could not statutorily
impose upon one adult, the daughter, liability for the cost of maintenance and
care of another adult, the parent, whom the state had committed to a hospital
for the mentally insane. The Supreme Court of California, in a unanimous opinion,
held: judgment for the Director of Mental Hygiene reversed. The statute imposing
liability on relatives of insane persons for support of such persons confined in state
institutions violates equal protection of the laws. Department of Mental Hygiene
v. Kirchner, 388 P.2d 720 (Cal. 1964).
At common law, since the parents were under a duty to support their minor
children, they were also under a duty to support their minor insane children. 2 Concomitantly, since there was no legal duty to support adult children, there was none
to support an adult incompetent," though there was some authority to the contrary.' The legal obligation imposed on the state to care for the mentally incompetent is created by statute.5 These statutes alone do not create a right in the
state to reimbursement from those individuals legally liable to support even an
insane child,0 so separate support statutes imposing liability on the relatives were
devised. 7 To date, all but five states have passed laws imposing this liability on the
30 See: Donald F. Turner, The 'Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 72 HAv. L. Rav. 50, 72 (1958).
1 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6650:
The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill person
or inebriate and the administrators of their estates, and the estate of such
mentally ill person or inebriate, shall be liable for his care, support, and
maintenance in a state institution in which he is an inmate.
2 Guthrie County v. Conrad, 133 Iowa 171, 110 N.W. 454 (1907).
3 Humboldt County v. Biegger, 232 Iowa 494, 4 N.W.2d 422 (1942).
4 In Re Glass' Estate, 175 Kan. 246, 262 P.2d 934 (1953).
5

6
7
§ 7:

MADDEN,

PERSONS AND DOmESTIC RELATIONS

§ 232 (1931).

Jones County v. Norton, 91 Iowa 680, 60 N.W. 200 (1894).
The earliest support statute, upon which all others are based, was Stat. 43 ELIz., ch. 2,
And be it further enacted, that the father and grandfather, and the
mother and grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, lame
and impotent person, or other poor person not able to work, being of a sufficient ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and maintain every such
poor person in that manner, and according to that rate, as by the justices of
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relatives. The instant case involves such a statute.
These statutes, which reflect divergent views as to the extent of the liability
to be imposed on the insane person and his relatives, 9 have successfully withstood
numerous consiftutional attacks,1 0 thereby inferring a general accord with the basic
policy of relieving the state of the full burden of support. One of the main grounds
for attack has been that the statute subjects the relative to double taxation. He
is taxed once by the state to support public institutions, and he is taxed a second
time by being required to pay for a patient's support therein, even though the
state has assumed responsibility for these insane. The answer, variously phrased,
has been essentially this: maintenance and care of the insane by the state not only
benefits the public, for which the tax is assessed, it also benefits the relatives of
the insane patient by supplying the facilities for treating the patient. Thus the
relatives are not taxed a second time, but are merely charged a reasonable cost for
services which but for the performance by the state should have been carried out
by these relatives." Courts have long recognized that support statutes are necessary to "protect the public from loss occasioned by neglect of a moral or natural
duty imposed on individuals, and to do this by transforming the imperfect moral
duty into a statutory and legal liability."'12 For a state to act upon the assumption
of the existence of such ties between family members is not contrary to our legal
history. The fact that the state at the same time recognizes its moral responsibility
to care for those indigent insane who have no financially able relatives is a clear
example of this.' 3
A second ground for attack arises because of a relatively recent change in the
coverage of support statutes in some states. Illinois has specifically exempted from
the support provisions relatives of an insane person committed on a criminal
charge.' 4 The argument was raised in Kough v. Hoehler'5 that the statute discriminated between those insane persons held in custody on a criminal charge and those
committed in a civil action for treatment and care. These people, the court said,
"'are in custody initially for the protection of the public, when convicted or accused
'
of a crime," 16
their insanity merely being incidental; thus their detention in the
mental institution should be equated with those prisoners held in jail at public
expense for the public benefit. California, on the other hand, amended its support
peace of that county where such sufficient persons dwell, or the greater
number of them, at their general quarter sessions shall be affected; (2) upon
pain that every one of them shall forfeit twenty shillings for every month
which they shall fail therein.
8 One state, New Mexico, imposes no charge at all. Four states, Arizona, Hawaii, Montana and South Carolina. impose liabilit) on the patient or his estate only.
9 These are 1) on the patient only (e.g., CODE OF LAWS, S.C., §§ 38-1026, 38-1027
(1962)); 2) on the patient and, in order of preference, spouse, parents, and children (e.g.,
ALAsXA STAT. § 47.30.270 (1962)); 3) on the patient and all relatives in the direct line of
ascendancy and descendancy, thus including grandparents (LA. STAT. ANN. C.C. § 229
(1952)) ; 4) on the patient, parents and friends (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.11 (1960)).
10 E.g., Beach v. District of Columbia, 320 F.2d 790 (1963); State v. Troxler, 202 Ind.
268, 173 N.E. 321 (1930); State v. Bateman, 110 Kan. 546, 204 Pac. 682 (1922); In Re
Idleman's Commitment, 146 Ore. 13, 27 P.2d 305 (1933).
11 E.g., State Commission in Lunacy v. Eldridge, 7 Cal.App. 298, 94 Pac. 597 (1908);
Kough v. Hoehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177 (1956); State v. Bateman, 110 Kan. 546, 204
Pac. 682 (1922); Kaiser v. State, 80 Kan. 364, 102 Pac. 454 (1909).
12 People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796, 798 (1896).
13

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6651:

The Director of Mental Hygiene may reduce, cancel or remit the
amount to be paid . . . on satisfactory proof that the estate or relatives
...
are unable to pay the cost of such care, support and maintenance....
14 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 Y2, § 1-8: "[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to apply to
any mentally ill person, or person supposed to be mentally ill, who is in custody on a criminal
charge."
15 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
16 Id. at 181.
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provisions to specifically include the criminally insane, 7 and the court held that
this could not be done consistently with the constitution, on the ground that relatives of criminals should not be deprived of their property merely because a
relation is a criminal.' 8
A third ground is that the support statutes impose one or another type of
unconstitutional discrimination. It has been argued that since not all insane persons
are treated alike, those having no wealthy relatives being entitled to charity, there
is discrimination within the class against those who have wealthy relatives. The
short answer to this has been that "the distinction between the helpless and those
able to help themselves is a natural one,"' 9 and therefore there is a valid basis for
the classification.
It was against this background of repeated rulings in favor of the constitutionality of patient support statutes that the decision in the instant case was
reached, reversing the law in California. To what extent this case will affect
future decisions in other jurisdictions depends in large part upon the peculiarities
of the statute involved, as well as upon the soundness of the reasoning used. Both
points will be considered.
In regard to the statute itself, the wording is such that the state is not required
to first seek recovery from the estate of the patient. "The liability of such persons
and estates shall be a joint and several liability." 20 The court in the instant case
cites Department of Mental Hygiene v. Black 2' as standing for the proposition that,
when construed with other sections of the Code, this provision imposes an unconditional obligation on the relatives, regardless of the size of the estate of the patient.
This imposition of "absolute liability" led the court to conclude that the relatives
22
had no "right of control over, or to recoup from, the assets of the patient."
One of the facts in the instant case was that the insane mother had an estate
of $11,000 which the state made no attempt to attach. Many state statutes provide
that this fund is to be attached first. 22
In regard to the court's reasoning, it should be noted at the outset that the
court makes an obvious attempt to establish a new state policy toward public
welfare. This in itself tends to undermine the validity of reliance on legal precedent and traditional views of classification in the area of relative support. Nevertheless, the court proceeds roughly in three steps to reach the desired result. The
24
first step consists in the extension of Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley
to the instant case. There it was held that the state could not require the relatives
of an insane person charged with a crime to pay the cost of his support. This
was extended in the present case to cover commitment in a civil action on the
finding that "the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case
encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own pro'25
tection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politiC.
Thus the court recognizes in the state the paramount obligation to pay since
society receives this substantial benefit.
The second phase of the argument of the court involves a citation of three
cases which are said to sustain the proposition that the state cannot discriminate
17 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6650: "Such liability shall exist whether the mentally ill
person or inebriate has become an inmate of a state institution pursuant to the provisions of this
code or... the Penal Code."
18 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal.2d 247, 379 P.2d 22 (1963).
19

In Re Yturburri's Estate, 134 Cal. 567, 66 Pac. 729 (1901), quoted in McKenna v.

Roberts County, 72 S.D. 250, 32 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1948).
20 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6650.
21 50 Cal.2d 742, 329 P.2d 689 (1963).
22 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 388 P.2d 720, 724 (Cal. 1964).
23 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.270 (1962); MicH. STAT. ANN. ch. 127, § 14.818 (1956).
State v. Panzeri, 76 Idaho 211, 280 P.2d 1064 (1955).
24 59 Cal.2d 247, 379 P.2d 22 (1963).
25 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 388 P.2d 720, 722 (Cal. 1964).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
against a person just because he is the relative of someone else. Two of these,

In Re Tetsubumi Yano's Estate8 and Oyama v. California,27 dealt with California's

land laws which prevented Japanese aliens from owning property, and as a result
limited the rights of their naturalized children to hold property. It was held that
limiting the rights of citizens just because their parents were aliens not eligible
for citizenship was a denial of equal protection of the laws. In other words, the
discrimination was on the basis of racial descent. The third case, Hoeper v. Tax
Commission,2 held that when the state granted to the wife the right to separate
property income, it could not continue to assess a tax against the husband based
in part on the income of the wife. The state has so acted as to prevent itself
from recognizing the otherwise legally enforceable obligations of the family relationship. It is therefore clear that the court here is put to the proof of one further
fact before it can utilize any of these cases: either 1) that insane persons in state
institutions are a burden of the state only, and so mental illness in a relative should
not be cause for limiting another's rights; or 2) that the state has so conducted
itself toward inmates of state institutions that others should not pay for their keep.
This constitutes the basis for the final part of the argument.
In the third phase the court deals with policy, mainly along the lines of the
second point made above:
[W]e need not blind ourselves to the social evolution which has been developing during the past half century; it has brought expanded recognition
of the parens patriae principle ... and other social responsibilities, including
the California Rehabilitation Center Act... and divers other public welfare
programs to which all citizens are contributing through presumptively duly
apportioned taxes. From all this it appears that former concepts which have
been suggested to uphold the imposition of support liability upon a person
selected by an administrative agent from 29
classes of relatives designated by
the Legislature may well be re-examined. [Emphasis supplied.]
Some of these welfare programs do not require contribution on the part of the

relatives.3 0 This, however, does not present a self-evident contradiction between
statutes as was found in the Hoeper case, but only reflects an inconsistency in the
policy of the state toward public charity. The conclusion thus seems to be that
public charity for some means public charity for all. A corollary to this proposition, giving support to the use of the Tetsubumi and Oyama decisions, is that
persons in state institutions are no longer the kind for which relatives ought to
pay. The argument of the court could therefore be reduced to the statement that
because the state has exhibited a new policy toward supporting public welfare
programs there is no longer any need to impose liability on relatives, especially
since the primary obligation rests upon the state.
Although it may be conceded that the growth of the parens patriae principle
is a valid consideration in formulating a new policy toward support law, there
are, nevertheless, numerous objections which can be made to the decision. First,
even though the relative can be sued before the estate of the patient is attached,
much of the hardship of this result could be alleviated because of the duty of
contribution on behalf of those who are jointly and severally liable. Thus, the
relative could get contribution from other relatives or the patient's estate. Also,
in regard to the argument of the court, it should be within the province of the
legislature to determine whether or not the role of the state as parens patriae
26 188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922).
27 332 US. 633 (1948).
28 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
29 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 388 P.2d 720, 723-24 (Cal. 1964).
(Emphasis added.)
30 E.g., The Disabled Person's Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4011 provides in part:
"No relative shall be held legally liable to support or to contribute to the support of any
applicant for or recipient of aid under this chapter." Also, the section on the Mentally Deficient, CAL. WELF. & INST. CoD- § 7011.5, now reads in part: "This section shall not be construed to impose any liability on the parents of mentally deficient persons."
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has precluded it from seeking support from the relatives of the insane. Another
objection is that there is no contradiction inherent in extending charity to some
but not to all. A third rests on the fact that in supporting this decision it is necessary to admit that which has always been held to the contrary in our legal system
- that family ties will no longer be sufficient to enforce legal duties. To adopt this
new view would tend to undermine the sense of family responsibility which is all
too rapidly disappearing in our society. Especially in the area of mental health,
where the emphasis today is on care, cure, and return to society, 31 there is more
need than ever for the family to remain closely bound, to maintain an interest in
the future of the insane. To prevent enforcement of a legal obligation to pay support will at least have the effect of encouraging presently interested families to
surrender all their familial obligations to the state.
Because of the drastic reversal by this court in prevailing sociological policy,
it is submitted that few, if any, courts in other states will follow the lead of California. Since the bulk of the court's argument rests on California's own scheme
of statutes, there is reason to believe that this case can be distinguished in many
jurisdictions. On the more practical level, the states over the years have become
increasingly dependent on this source of revenue to help defray their expenses.3 2
Since the rationale of the decision could be easily applied to other areas of the
law, such as old age assistance statutes, 33 there is cause to expect further impairment of the income of the state. If this, or any of this, be true, the impact of the
decision should not reach beyond the borders of California."
John M.

Lamont

CRIMINAL LAW-CONTRACTS-NOLLE PROSEQUI AGREEMENT BETWEEN ACCUSED
AND PROSECUTOR NOT ENFORCEABLE AS LACKING ADEQUATE CONSmERATON.-

Joseph Ashby was indicted on five counts of "Open Lewdness"' by a Burlington
County, New Jersey, grand jury for exposing himself during a forty-day period ending

May 16, 1962. A subsequent psychiatric examination revealed his responsiveness to
treatment with a favorable prognosis of complete rehabilitation. His counsel sought
the aid of the prosecutor in urging that Ashby be allowed to enter pleas to the
lesser charges of being a "Disorderly Person"' 2 and nolle prosequi the criminal
indictments. The prosecutor deferred and suggested this matter be taken up with
the assignment judge. Inasmuch as the assignment judge was vacationing, the
acting assignment judge was consulted, and his permission to allow the nolle prosequi
was in the form of a letter to the county judge. The county judge acknowledged
receipt and concurrence with the acting assignment judge in directing the prosecutor
to notify the municipal magistrates with jurisdiction of the newly selected approach
to the offenses. Ashby appeared, pleaded guilty to being disorderly, and was fined
in two of the five scheduled municipal hearings. The assignment judge, upon
returning from his vacation, refused to allow the remaining three indictments
similar disposition, insisting upon the criminal prosecution, and the prosecutor accordingly refused to move that they be nolle prosequied. On appeal of a denied
motion before the county judge to nolle prosequi or dismiss the criminal indictments, the New Jersey Appellate Court held: motions for dismissal and nolle prosequi
are proper only before assignment judge; the prosecutor has no authority to make
31
32

Respondent's petition for rehearing, pp. 22-29.
See generally Rushfelt, Liability for Support of Patients in State Hospitals, 26 J.B.A.

KAN. 409 (1958).

33 Such statutes have generally been upheld as constitutional. E.g., Maricopa County v.
Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949); Kelley v. State Board, 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 186
P.2d 429 (1947); Mallat v. Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956).
34 The Attorney General of California plans to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court in this case. Letter from John C. Porter, Deputy Attorney of California,to the
NoTRE DAME LAWYER, May 8, 1964, on file in the NOTRE DAME LAWYER office.
1 N.J.

2 N.J.

STAT. ANN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:115-1 (1953).
§ 2A:170-5 (1953).
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any agreement on the subject of guilt of a particular crime, and if made, defendant
is charged with the knowledge that it is clearly illegal. State v. Ashby, 81 N.J. Super.
350, 195 A.2d 635 (1963).
The correctness of this denial is firmly buttressed by a New Jersey procedural
rule, 3 vesting the dismissal power prior to trial in the assignment judge. This
portion of the holding is incapable of generating much well-reasoned disagreement.
The unenforceability aspect of the agreement between the accused and the state
does not, however, enjoy such a quiet repose.
New Jersey shares the approach of the American Law Institute in the mechanics of a nolle prosequi motion, i.e., a duality of functions divided between the
prosecutor and the court. Briefly stated, the prosecutor or equivalent officer can
enter a nolle prosequi motion, but to the court is reserved the power to grant or
deny the motion. This curtailment is obviously designed to preclude any abuses of
the nolle prosequi.5 There are, however, jurisdictions that do impart to the prosecutor both functions without any allowance for any judicial participation in the
nolle prosequi. 8
The tacit existence of "deals, .... agreements" or "bargains" between an accused
and the state7 has apparently failed to provoke a volume of decisional law commensurate with the vigor attributed to this practice. A likely explanation is the
full performance rendered by the state, as a party to these agreements. Kentucky
is a proponent of strict statutory requirements to be followed in nolle prosequi
situations by the moving prosecutor, which refuses to recognize the enforceability of
arrangements, this statutory compliance lacking. The New Jersey Court in rejecting
Ashby's motion to nolle prosequi relied upon two Kentucky cases, which faced somewhat analogous situations. In Commonwealth v. Hughes," the prosecutor entered
an agreement with defendant's counsel to dismiss a manslaughter charge if a third
continuance was necessary to produce a key state witness. This oral agreement
was made with court knowledge. The witness did not appear and the prosecutor
insisted upon trial. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held the lower court's dismissal in error, recognizing the prosecutor's right to repudiate the previously entered
agreement. Commonwealth v. Smith 9 involved a defendant indicted for murder
on two counts, who in consideration for pleading guilty to one charge, was assured
no further prosecution would be sought on the other outstanding charge. This
agreement also was made by the prosecutor with the knowledge of the judge.
Three years later, a different prosecutor revived the charge and moved to prosecute
the second murder charge. Here the Court of Appeals found no legal machinery
to make this agreement binding. The language of the court provides some interesting insight into their sentiments:
We feel constrained to say that this Court thinks appellee has been most
unfairly treated by the Commonwealth. . . . The present Commonwealth
Attorney is going back on the agreement made . . . and approved by the
Trial judge.... Of all persons appearing in criminal courts, the prosecuting
officer should be the last to go back on an agreement ...
1o

This statement was followed by a suggestion that executive clemency be granted
to Smith since the courts were without authority to "right the great injustices done
him."'
3
4

5

N.J. RULES 3:11-3.
ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIM. PROC.

§ 295 (1930).
See Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure- A Critical Appraisal, 14 LA. L. REv.

11, 25-26 (1953).

6 Ibid; See Kosicki, The Function of Nolle Prosequi and Motion to Dismiss in Con-

necticut, 36 CONN. B. J. 159 (1962).

7 See Arnold, Law Enforcement- An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L. J. 1,
9 (1932).
8
9
10

153 Ky. 34, 154 S.W. 399 (Ct. App. 1913).
244 S.W.2d 724 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
Id. at 726.

11

Ibid.
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An articulate judicial pronouncement in favor of upholding agreements is
State v. Ward.'2 Ward, the perpetrator of bank law violations in West Virginia,
was indicted on fourteen counts. He agreed, with the consent of the court, to
cooperate with the Banking Commission in unraveling his misdeeds, in return
for allowing him to plead to a single indictment, the remaining thirteen to be nolle
prosequied. He rendered the cooperation, was tried, sentenced to prison, released,
and the prosecutor moved on the thirteen indictments outstanding against Ward.
The court held:
Promises of immunity from prosecution made to a witness by a prosecuting
officer with the consent of the court are justified on the ground of public
policy .... The courts treat such promises as pledges of the public faith.
•.. The promise alleged in the instant plea (that of the prosecuting attorney
a pledge of the public faith which
with the approval of the court) is equally
3
in our opinion should be duly kept.'

The instructive force derived from this case law holding that bargains entered
by the prosecutor with the consent of the court should be binding upon the state
is greatly diminished by the New Jersey Court's election to impeach the nature
of the lower court's consent granted to Ashby. It is the feeling of the Appellate
Court that Ashby's counsel did not fully and fairly inform the acting assignment
judge that five indictments were involved or the predilection of the regular assignment judge to deny his consent to this type of agreement. Thus the letter of
acquiescence from the acting assignment judge is totally disregarded in framing
the case issue for resolution. The court says:
A significant issue in this case is the question of the validity of an agreement
between the prosecutor and a defendant to nolle prosequi or dismiss an
indictment.' 4

The decision in the case as a result, cannot transcend the restrictions so imposed,
thus brutally excluding from view the Ward line, which emphasizes the pledge
of public faith.
The court also distinguishes the Ward line by the absence of consideration
accruing to the state for its promise to allow Ashby to plead to the lesser charge.
Ashby did not have, hence could not give, the state adequate consideration in the
form of assistance or information for subsequent prosecution, his or anyone else's.
The manifest uneasiness of this position concluding this agreement illegal as lacking
consideration, hence not a bar to prosecution of the indictments is shown by the
court's words:
This is simply the balancing of a reduction in the charge or the elimination of a charge against a cooperative defendant with the probability of a
conviction of another defendant resulting5 from that cooperation. On balance,
there is a gain accruing to the public.'

Summoned in support of this rationale is the Restatement:
A bargain by a prosecuting officer with a person accused of a crime to
recommend to the court a nol. pros. in consideration of the accused becoming a witness for the State, is not illegal. But any other bargain to
secure a nol. pros. or the recommendation of a nol. pros., except by the6
presentation of facts showing that the accused person is not guilty, is illegal.'

The dissenting judge reflects, "the morals of the market place are a poor guide
for the sovereign's actions,"'17 questioning the wisdom of contractual abstraction
being determinative of criminal cases. The Restatement 8 says contracts that induce
definite and substantial action binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Ashby has forgone his right to trial on two counts in pleading
guilty in the municipal court, which can hardly be termed less than definite and
substantial action.
12 112 W.Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (Sup. Ct. App. 1932).
13 Id. at 554-555, 165 S.E. at 804-805 (emphasis added).
14 State v. Ashby, 195 A.2d 635, 641 (1963).
15 Id. at 642.
16 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 549 (1932).
17 State v. Ashby, 195 A.2d 635, 646 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
18 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS, § 90 (1932).
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Of eminent importance in the resolution of the problems surrounding prosecutor-accused agreements is the public faith pledge extended to a citizen. The
merits and wisdom of any particular bargain aside, the population as a whole,
justifiably expects the state, above all others, to keep its bond. Engaging as the
efforts of the Ashby court are to distinguish his case from the favorable precedent,
the public pledge, the honor of the sovereign is upheld slightly, if at all. The
American "grandfather" case which strongly espouses the necessity for fundamental
fairness by the state in dealing with the citizens is Commonwealth v. St. John.'
The accused was promised immunity from prosecution by police officials, and the
discretion of the trial judge was held decisive in denying him immunity. The
court did, however, include the oft cited language:
When such promises are made by the public prosecutor, or with his authority,
the court will see that due regard is paid them, and that the public faith
which has been pledged by him is duly kept.O
This denial of immunity from prosecution was accompanied by a recommendation
for executive clemency.
The dignity of this public pledge is to be sharply and critically distinguished
from the contentions arising on habeas corpus applications. 21 Those seeking the
writ have an understandable tendency toward fabricating agreements with the
prosecutor in seeking to "catch the judicial eye." The reaction of the judiciary
in giving these contentions equally understandably cursory treatment presents an
entirely different slant on good faith pledges. It is from this context of judicial
skepticism that the New Jersey court drew its support for the following holding in
Ashby:
[W]e have held in our State that a prosecutor has no authority to make any
agreement on the subject of guilt of a particular crime or a sentence ...
that even if such an agreement were made, defendant is charged with the
knowledge that it is clearly illegal."2

In the exceptional case,"2 executive clemency was suggested as the proper avenue
for relief rather than test the existence of such an agreement.
A less important policy consideration than that of a public pledge which is
raised by this decision is the effect on the further use of the agreement in New
Jersey law enforcement. Initial recognition of the good that does result from
"deals" in apprehending suspected offenders that would otherwise be, beyond
the reach of law enforcement officers leads one to believe, as the writer does, that
such use will be greatly frustrated by this holding. With the advent of mandatory
counsel assignment in state courts, 24 will not New Jersey be placed in a position
of suspect? May, would, or should an attorney be a party to any agreement for a
lesser charge for his client under fear of being faced with rules of contract law
as grounds for repudiation by the state, holding the information supplied was
"inadequate consideration," thus illegal? The instant case provides no predictable
guidelines for prior determination of "adequate consideration."
Hopefully, on appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court will return the luster to
the sovereign's crown and hold binding a pledge made to an apparently earnest
citizen who sought justice in its courts. Judicial consent, formal or informal was
given. Consideration, as detrimental reliance in forbearing trial by jury was incurred
by the defendant. But most importantly, the public faith was pledged and this
pledge was repudiated.
__________John

T. Mulvihi~l

19 173 Mass. 566, 54 N.E. 254 (1899).
20 Id. at 569, 54 N.E. at 254.
21 State v. Pometti, 12 N.J. 446, 97 A.2d 399 (1953); In re Cardinale, 36 N.J. Super.
137, 115 A.2d 125 (App. Div. 1955); State v. Terry, 30 N.J. Super. 288, 104 A.2d 332
(App. Div. 1954).
22 State v. Ashby, 195 A.2d 635, 642.
23 State v. Miller, 16 N.J. Super. 251, 84 A.2d 459 (App. Div. 1951), cert. denied 342

U.S. 934 (1952).

24 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

